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Integrating Agonism with Deliberation  
– Realising the Benefits
Abstract: In “Agonism as Deliberation” (Knops 2007) I suggest a reconciliation between 
Mouffe’s agonist version of democracy, adjusted to preserve consistency, and deliberation. 
Here I reply to two subsequent criticisms of this project: Gürsözlü (2009) and Fives (2009). 
Although both hold agonism and deliberation incompatible impossible, they do so from 
opposing perspectives. Gürsözlü defends Mouffe’s agonism as distinct and coherent on the 
basis of what he considers a correct understanding of her concept of hegemony. Fives ar-
gues Mouffe’s approach is separate but incoherent, and should be rejected. Against these 
two conflicting positions, I seek to demonstrate not only that integration between ago-
nism and democracy is possible, but that it has distinct benefits for both agonism and de-
liberative theory. Divested of its contradictory assertion that universal rational consensus 
is impossible in principle, agonism can be interpreted as theory of the moment of differ-
ence within a broader deliberative dialectic that seeks to move from more to less partial 
consensus. Conceived in this way, we can better appreciate how these two approaches can 
complement one another, in pursuing shared goals, rather than the static and unnecessary 
opposition offered by the two critics I address here.
Key words: democracy, agonism, deliberation, Mouffe, Habermas.
In “Agonism as Deliberation” (Knops 2007) I argue that Mouffe’s agonist theory 
of democracy implicitly relies on the concept of a universal rational consensus 
while explicitly denying its possibility. Mouffe’s assertion that such consensus is 
impossible in principle is itself a universal claim, which she uses rational arguments 
to advance. Her agonist conception of democracy also assumes  agreement on 
 ethico-political principles, and the identification of and action against oppression 
(2007: 115–8). As a result, Mouffe commits a performative contradiction.  Because 
of this her agonism is internally incoherent. 
As a way round this dilemma, I suggest the theories of language Mouffe uses to 
ground her assertion that rational consensus is conceptually impossible are sus-
ceptible to an alternative interpretation. That alternative is compatible with 
the deliberative theory of democracy whose assumptions Mouffe uses them to 
 criticise (2007: 118–25). Appreciating this similarity, I maintain, means that despite 
Mouffe’s denial of the possibility of universal rational consensus, her substantive 
ambitions in proposing agonism—challenging domination, respecting diversity 
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and guarding against premature and partial closure in political agreements—can 
be maximally retained and animated. Moreover, deliberative theorists can benefit 
from paying attention to the dangers signalled by agonist insights. Avoiding these 
problems is integral to deliberation’s goal of reaching inclusive rational consensus. 
In this way agonism and deliberation can be seen as complementary, emphasising 
different elements of a shared project, rather than irrevocably opposed (2007: 125). 
Two articles have since taken direct issue with this attempt to integrate Mouffe’s 
agonism with deliberation (Gürsözlü 2009; Fives 2009). Both argue I fail to rec-
ognise the gulf between agonism and deliberation, simplifying their connection. 
Gürsözlü contends I misunderstand Mouffe’s characterisation of her agonism as 
another hegemonic project. Within that project, she is entitled to talk of shared, 
or fixed, values or principles (Gürsözlü 2009: 359). Moreover, hegemonies arise 
from a political terrain characterised by power and conflict. Not only are attempts 
at consensus contextualised, they are also contingent and subject to challenge. 
This justifies Mouffe’s emphasis on contestatory tactics in defence of agonist de-
mocracy, which stress conflict, defining subject-positions, allegiance to identity, 
persuasion and the passions. These contrast starkly, Gürsözlü contends, with a 
deliberative emphasis on reasoned argument aimed at neutral consensus (Gürsö-
zlü 2009: 360–1). For Gürsözlü, a correct understanding of hegemony both jus-
tifies Mouffe’s agonism as coherent, and demonstrates its distinctiveness from a 
deliberative approach. Any attempt to recruit it to that approach represents an 
 attempt at hegemonic colonisation by deliberation (Gürsözlü 2009: 366–7). 
Similar to Gürsözlü, Fives views Mouffe’s agonism as both contextual and contes-
tatory (Fives 2009: 975). However, unlike Gürsözlü, for Fives this does not mean 
her theory is coherent. The opposite: Mouffe’s argument that a neutral, univer-
sal consensus reached by rational means is in principle impossible places her in 
performative contradiction. Her agonism is inconsistent (Fives 2009: 968). More-
over, the contextualism of her theory means it is also relativist—lacking a context-
independent standard of judgement, and immoralist—it has no way of judging 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ political positions (Fives 2009: 968–70). Fives implies 
that this, combined with the contestatory tactics advocated by Mouffe, sets her 
agonism apart from deliberation. Thus any attempt to combine the two positions 
must ultimately favour one or the other (Fives 2009: 973–4). Fives clearly advo-
cates universalist deliberative liberal democracy over agonism. However, due to 
the liberal commitment to moral neutrality, he argues that his preferred stance 
cannot defend itself against agonism. It must be supplemented by a perfectionist 
ethic in support of the deliberative virtues—the practises that deliberative theory 
holds are necessary for rational exchange (Fives 2009: 974–8). 
Thus, although Gürsözlü and Fives both oppose integration on the grounds that 
agonism and deliberation are distinct due to agonism’s contextualism,  contingency 
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and contestation, they do so for opposite purposes and arrive at opposite conclu-
sions. Gürsözlü uses it to vindicate a separate consistent agonism. Fives uses it 
to argue for a liberal deliberative version of democracy over an agonism he holds 
inconsistent, and to suggest that to do this deliberative values and practices re-
quire a universalist, perfectionist grounding. Here I explain why I think they are 
both wrong to argue that agonist insights cannot be integrated with deliberation 
in a combined as I proposed in ‘Agonism as Deliberation’. This also gives me the 
 opportunity to clarify the relationship between Mouffe’s thinking and delibera-
tive democracy that I espouse, and the benefits it has to offer. 
My explanation proceeds in two phases. As a preliminary it is necessary to deal 
with the question of contradiction (section 3). The inconsistency of the agonist 
claim that universal rational consensus is impossible in principle both motivates 
my attempt to preserve agonist insights and opens the possibility of doing so with-
in a deliberative frame. More positively, the principle that contradiction must be 
avoided provides an ethically neutral basis on which to defend deliberative prin-
ciples. This renders Fives’s perfectionist virtue ethics unnecessary. So a treatment 
of contradiction is an indispensable prelude to considering the possibility of inte-
grating agonism and deliberation and why such a step might be useful. 
In the second phase of my reply I address these two further issues. I attempt to 
show how integration of agonism as a theory of the moment of difference within a 
broader deliberative dialectic is both possible and effective in preserving the sub-
stance of agonist goals at the same time as constructively promoting deliberation. 
I first outline my argument in ‘Agonism as Deliberation’ that the theories of lan-
guage underpinning agonism and deliberation are compatible. This forms the ba-
sis of my combined model whose main features I briefly recap (section 4). I then 
show how, within that framework, the agonist concepts of hegemony and contex-
tual consensus, contingency and contestation can all be recognised—indeed de-
fined more clearly and animated—while avoiding the negative consequences of 
contradiction, relativity and immoralism warned against by Fives. In fact I go fur-
ther to demonstrate that these insights have an important contribution to make 
to the realisation of goals which agonism shares with deliberation (section 5). Be-
fore any of this, however, I first need to outline the views of my critics in more de-
tail: Gürsözlü in section 1 and Fives in section 2. 
1. Gürsözlü—Recognizing the Difference
Essentially Gürsözlü accuses me of failing to understand Mouffe’s characteri-
sation of the political as thoroughly hegemonic. In ‘Agonism as Deliberation’ I 
charge Mouffe with presuming a consensus on the values of pluralist democracy, 
which would itself be hegemonic, in her attempt to defend those values (Knops 
2007: 116–7). Gürsözlü claims that to criticise Mouffe for being hegemonic in this 
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way is ‘missing the core element’ of her approach. Properly understood, it is not 
flaw in Mouffe’s argument that her version of democracy takes the form of a hege-
monic consensus: ‘for Mouffe, what consensus around liberal democratic  values 
means is the constitution of a hegemony, not the elimination of it’ (Gürsözlü 
2009: 358–9, original emphasis). 
Gürsözlü elaborates that Mouffe’s account of hegemony is grounded in her de-
scription of politics as ineradicably constituted by power relations. This draws in 
turn on her earlier work on hegemony with Laclau (Laclau & Mouffe 1985). Any 
attempt at consensus is ‘political and based on some form of exclusion’ in that 
it must always rule out other forms of action than those agreed upon, and the 
groups whose interests such action would promote (Mouffe 2000: 100 in Gürsözlü 
2009: 358). Because any consensus relies on this relation of exclusion, it remains 
partial and contingent, always open to pressure from its excluded ‘exterior’. Hege-
mony, for Mouffe, arises when we fail to recognise the partiality and contingency 
of a particular consensus, and instead construe it as universal and, since this rules 
out any alternative, objective (Gürsözlü 2009: 358). Gürsözlü quotes Laclau and 
Mouffe’s original formulation of hegemony as a situation ‘where a certain particu-
larity assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with 
it’ (1985: xii in Gürsözlü 2009: 359 note 15). 
Given this account of political relations, Gürsözlü contends Mouffe’s vision of de-
mocracy is not, as he suggests deliberative theories would have it, to agree prin-
ciples of association that eliminate power and division. Rather it is to ‘constitute 
forms of power more compatible with democratic values’ (Mouffe 2005: 22 in 
Gürsözlü 2009: 359). Such ‘forms of power’ will be as hegemonic as any other. So it 
is necessary to distinguish between democratic outsiders and insiders: ‘them’ and 
‘us’. External democratic enemies ‘challenge the very existence of the institutions 
of the democratic political association’ (Gürsözlü 2009: 359). Internal  democratic 
‘adversaries,’ on the other hand, may hold different and sometimes conflicting 
beliefs, but these are not fundamentally threatening to democracy itself. They 
should therefore be tolerated, respected and free to contest their competing ver-
sions of the democratic project (Gürsözlü 2009: 359–60). From this perspective, 
the task of democracy is to take antagonistic political relations, which require 
 enemies to be destroyed, and ‘domesticate’ them into adversarial relations where 
differences in belief are recognised (Gürsözlü 2009: 359–60). If the contextualised 
nature of hegemonic knowledge is properly understood, Gürsözlü claims, then 
Mouffe can consistently sustain the value consensus that these distinctions imply 
within her agonistic discourse constituted as another hegemony, despite asserting 
a universal consensus on values is in principle impossible. 
Mouffe’s thoroughly hegemonic account of the political not only legitimises a 
contextual consensus within agonism. It also explains the particular contestatory 
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tactics by which agonist politics should be conducted. ‘Conflict and confronta-
tion’ is to be welcomed in a democracy, albeit within agonist bounds. It is a sign of 
democracy’s vitality, not its weakness in failing to reach a deliberative consensus 
(Gürsözlü 2009: 361). In promoting agonist democracy over other systems, Mouffe 
allocates a leading role to the passions, in contrast to deliberation’s emphasis on 
reasons. Although Gürsözlü admits Mouffe acknowledges some role for ‘provid-
ing… reasons’ in promoting democracy, she centrally advocates ‘mobilising the 
passions’. Gürsözlü claims this goes beyond argument, to ‘creating subject posi-
tions, and power relations that are compatible with liberal democracy’ thereby 
encouraging identification with that project through ‘persuasion’ as opposed to 
rational argument (Gürsözlü 2009: 360–1). 
Gürsözlü, then, argues I fail to grasp ‘how Mouffe understands consensus and he-
gemony’ (Gürsözlü 2009: 360). Correctly understood, there is no contradiction 
between her advocacy of agonistic democracy and her hegemonic characterisa-
tion of politics, as Mouffe construes agonism as another hegemonic form. He-
gemony’s contextualism allows her to talk of values, standards and distinctions 
within that agonist form. Furthermore, it justifies contestatory tactics, both with-
in agonism and as a method of defending it, due to the contingent nature of any 
hegemony and the impossibility of a universal, objective consensus on rational 
grounds. Not only does this interpretation of hegemony justify Mouffe’s agonism 
as a coherent project, according to Gürsözlü. It also distinguishes it from the de-
liberative endeavour. My attempt to reconcile the two, he claims, is simply an ex-
ample of an attempt at hegemonic domination by deliberation. The most that can 
be achieved is a mutual recognition of the competing claims that each approach 
makes, recognising them as two distinct hegemonic positions, competing with 
each other in a ‘vibrant, constructive, agonism’ (Gürsözlü 2009: 367). 
2. Fives—the good (deliberative) democrat
Fives accepts the characterisation of Mouffe’s agonism as contextualist and con-
testatory (Fives 2009: 975). He also thinks it is impossible to combine agonist 
and deliberative theories of democracy (Fives 2009: 968, 972). In these respects 
his views coincide with those of Gürsözlü. However, unlike Gürsözlü he believes 
that agonism is inconsistent and flawed (Fives 2009: 968–70). He thus sets up an 
 opposition between agonism and deliberation similar to Gürsözlü’s, but favours 
the opposite side—deliberation over agonism. 
Fives’s criticisms of agonism are that it is contradictory, and that its contextual-
ism gives rise to an undesirable relativism and immoralism (Fives 2009: 967–70). 
He identifies a contradiction in Mouffe’s agonism between what she asserts—the 
contextualism and contestability of all political positions—and what her as-
sertion assumes: ‘that this position should be accepted universally on rational 
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grounds; and that her agonistic pluralism is normatively preferable to consensus-
based liberalism’ (Fives 2009: 968). In addition, he argues, Mouffe’s eschewal of 
context-independent standards—her contextualism—means her agonism is rel-
ativist, ultimately lacking fixed meanings or standards. It is also ‘immoralist’ in 
that it is incapable of distinguishing between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ political systems. 
This he contrasts to the universal principles of rationality and mutuality that he 
sees as underpinning a deliberative construction of liberal democracy (Fives 2009: 
968– 70). Fives also juxtaposes the political strategies agonism and deliberation 
respectively sanction. Agonism, he argues, promotes ‘contestability’ and conflict, 
as opposed to the deliberative virtues of ‘reasonableness’ (Fives 2009: p. 976). For 
these reasons, Fives sees Mouffe’s agonism as distinct from a deliberative interpre-
tation of liberal democracy. Consequently he argues I am wrong to suggest it is 
possible to integrate insights from these two perspectives, despite acknowledging 
I recognise the contradictions that agonism implies (Fives 2009: 968). Instead, he 
attempts to show any such endeavour must ultimately come down in favour of one 
or position or the other (Fives 2009: 973–974). 
In this struggle Fives is clear that he favours the deliberative over the agonist ver-
sion of democracy. However, despite the weaknesses he identifies in the ago-
nist position—self-contradiction, relativity and immoralism—he feels delibera-
tion is insufficiently equipped to defend itself by characterising agonism as an 
 unacceptable conception of the good. Since deliberation accepts the liberal prin-
ciple of moral neutrality between different universal world-views, it is powerless 
to condemn one or promote another on moral grounds (Fives 2009: 975–976). For 
this reason, Fives argues, it is necessary to supplement a deliberative perspective 
with a perfectionist ethics, which he uses to buttress the deliberative practices 
and  values, or ‘virtues’ as he construes them (Fives 2009: 975). He does, however, 
 recognise the danger that this strategy may itself be accused of the very relativ-
ism that he attributes to agonism, and the need for his chosen approach to retain 
 respect for liberal human rights (Fives 2009: 975). 
So both Gürsözlü and Fives conclude that I am wrong to attempt an integration of 
agonist principles into a deliberative framework on account of agonism’s contex-
tualism and contestatory nature. Gürsözlü because he believes agonism is consis-
tent and that such an attempt would amount to hegemonic domination by delib-
eration. Fives because he believes agonism is contradictory, relativist, immoralist 
and that its contestatory precepts are opposed to the deliberative ‘virtues’ which 
require the protection of a perfectionist ethics. I will now take issue with both 
positions, to show that not only is it possible to integrate elements of agonism 
and deliberation, but that such a model has much to offer each perspective. Be-
fore doing this, however, I have to make clear that the agonism that I integrate is 
one that has been divested of its central contradiction. In this sense, Gürsözlü is 
correct to state that my proposal for combining the two positions is based on a 
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‘ reinterpretation’ of agonism (Gürsözlü 2009: 356). Indeed, the desire to avoid this 
inconsistency while salvaging agonism’s substantive insights was what motivated 
my endeavour in ‘Agonism as Deliberation’ (Knops 2007: 118). But this step is not 
optional, as Gürsözlü seems to imply. A theory of agonism that retains this con-
tradiction is incoherent. Any consistent interpretation of Mouffe’s agonism must 
be re-interpreted in this way. The avoidance of contradiction can also serve as the 
basis for an ethically neutral defence of deliberative principles. This is necessary 
if Fives’s alternative of a perfectionist virtue ethics, which would place delibera-
tive practices in direct conflict with agonistic insights, is to be ruled out. So I first 
examine this question of contradiction, to clarify the modifications that must be 
effected to agonism, and to allow deliberation to stand without recourse to Fives’s 
exclusive perfectionism. With the ground thus cleared, I can then consider both 
the form I suggest an integration between agonism and deliberation should take, 
and the benefits it can bring. 
3. Contradiction
Firstly, I want to consider the performative contradiction at the heart of Mouffe’s 
claim that a universal rational consensus is impossible even in principle. Despite 
Gürsözlü’s criticisms, it seems the first point I made in respect of this in my origi-
nal article still stands. The claim that all political consensus is necessarily hege-
monic, and the arguments that Mouffe offers to back it up, represents a univer-
sal assertion, presented for agreement by all, motivated by reasons. As such the 
act of assertion contradicts what is being asserted: a performative contradiction 
(Knops 2007: 115–6). Fives recognises this point (Fives 2009: 968). Unfortunately, 
Gürsözlü does not engage with it. Instead, he takes my secondary argument, that 
Mouffe’s version of agonism itself implies a rational consensus on ethico-politi-
cal principals, in isolation from this earlier point (Gürsözlü 2009: 358). Gürsözlü 
does this in an attempt to show that the proper understanding of hegemony, out-
lined above, allows Mouffe to talk of agonist consensus while maintaining that ul-
timately universal consensus is in principle impossible. Yet even on these terms 
it is not possible to sustain the idea that a universal rational consensus must be 
ruled out in principle. 
As we have seen, Gürsözlü’s objection is primarily that I fail to fully grasp Mouffe’s 
notion of hegemony. He draws on her earlier work on this concept with Laclau to 
develop a better understanding of her position. His contention that Mouffe may 
invoke a degree of consensus within a particular hegemonic form—in this case 
her agonism—would seem to receive support from this source. Although arguing 
that the political is ultimately contingent, Laclau and Mouffe define ‘hegemonic 
formations’ as comprising ‘systems of differences which partially define  relational 
identities’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 142). A ‘hegemonic formation’ is a discourse 
that has been constructed antagonistically, in opposition to other  discourses, 
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which form its ‘exterior’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 135–6). Exterior discourses might 
contest a hegemonic formation’s ‘relational identities’ in an attempt to destabilise 
them. But internally a hegemonic formation—indeed any discourse according to 
Laclau and Mouffe—is capable of constructing ‘nodal points which partially fix 
meaning’ by articulating their relation (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 112–3). 
However, although Gürsözlü’s point that Mouffe is entitled to speak of consensus 
on principles relative to her agonist, hegemonic, framework receives support from 
these sources, a conflict remains with the broader assertion that universal con-
sensus is in principle impossible. For if Laclau and Mouffe admit the possibility 
of partial objectivity and agreement surely they must accept the possibility that 
some agreements will be more or less partial? And if they accept that some agree-
ments will be less partial, must they not acknowledge at minimum the possibility 
of a least partial agreement—in other words a universal consensus that encom-
passes the interests of all? Such an agreement may be very difficult to achieve in 
practice. But it would seem that the same arguments that permit Mouffe to avail 
herself of the notion of a partial consensus, within a hegemonic form, necessarily 
imply that a full universal consensus is at least a conceptual possibility. 
So, even when we consider Gürsözlü’s arguments on their own merits, they are un-
able to sustain Mouffe’s claim that universal consensus is in principle  impossible 
to conceive. This is important, since that claim is what sets agonism and de-
liberation at odds. Mouffe’s denial of the possibility even in principle of a rational, 
neutral consensus deprives deliberation of its rationale. The whole purpose of de-
liberative activity becomes difficult to justify. While practical examples may fall 
short of this ideal, retaining it as an ideal provides a standard against which actual 
instances can be evaluated, and the extent to which they fall short gauged. Once 
admitted we have not only an ideal at which deliberation can aim, but a standard 
for assessing progress towards that ideal and distinguishing more from less par-
tial consensus in practise. 
Of course, it might be objected that in restoring this deliberative tenet we deprive 
agonism of a core principle instead. Does this not similarly undermine the ago-
nist project? Denial of the possibility in principle of a universal, neutral consen-
sus arrived at by rational means is certainly a central article in Mouffe’s account 
of agonism and the underlying hegemonic concept of the political she developed 
with Laclau. At the same time, we have shown there is no option but to reject this 
assertion. Failure to do so commits a performative contradiction, rendering her 
theory incoherent. Yet despite the prominence of the belief in the impossibility of 
universal consensus for Mouffe, the substance of agonism—its aims, but also its 
concepts and methods—far from being compromised by its rejection, can be pre-
served and indeed enhanced. Divesting agonism of the insistence that it is impos-
sible in principle to conceive of universal, neutral consensus opens the way to an 
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integration of agonism and deliberation within a dialectic that encompasses both. 
Through that integration we can appreciate the essential dimensions which both 
positions share, and how their promotion can be enhanced by combining insights 
from each. These dimensions include recognition, respect and contestation of dif-
ference grounded in context and subjectivity, acting against domination, and the 
avoidance of premature closure in political agreement that marginalises. Before 
moving to a consideration of integration, however, we need first to address a final 
obstacle to that relationship: Fives’s concerns about the limitations of a delibera-
tive perspective. 
Even if we can retain the concept of a universal rational consensus as the telos of 
deliberation, Fives argues that deliberative democratic principles are themselves 
insufficient for defending the values and practices by which such a project should 
be pursued. Drawing on Gutmann and Thompson, Rawls and MacIntyre, Fives 
identifies these ‘virtues’ of reasonable debate—such as openness to questioning, 
free exchange and mutuality—as comprising the process of rational interchange 
(Fives 2009: 963, 76 & 8; Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 52–3; Rawls 2001: 432; 
MacIntyre 1999: 161). He argues they cannot be defended against agonist alter-
natives because deliberation adheres to the liberal principle of ethical neutrali-
ty. Deliberation’s advocates cannot therefore distinguish between different world-
views—in this case agonism and deliberation—promoting one as good, and the 
other as bad. Consequently, advocates of deliberation cannot recommend that 
the deliberative goal of consensus is pursued by these rational means as opposed 
to, for example, the more conflictual or contestatory measures advanced by ago-
nism (Fives 2009: 976). 
There are two ways in which this argument of Fives is mistaken. Firstly, it is pos-
sible to positively defend deliberative principles while remaining ethically neu-
tral. The need for any theory to avoid performative contradiction guarantees these 
principles. For they comprise—at least in Habermas’s version of deliberation that 
I defend—what must be presupposed in any attempt at communication if such 
contradiction is to be avoided (Habermas 1990: 88–90). So, for example, the prin-
ciple that participants must be free to make any assertion they wish cannot be 
challenged without exercising a freedom to make assertions. And the principle 
that participants must be free to question any assertion cannot be questioned 
without exercising the freedom to question. Such a deduction is rational, and so 
ethically neutral—it is indeed possible to defend deliberative principles on an 
ethically neutral basis. It is therefore unnecessary to rely on perfectionist ethics in 
defence of deliberative ‘virtues’ as Fives proposes. At the same time, this does not 
mean that deliberation is guilty of ‘immoralism’—an inability to decide between 
different moral positions. Moral standards can be arrived at through the delibera-
tive process, grounded in the rational presuppositions of deliberation. Although 
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that process does not directly prescribe substantive ethical positions, it does pro-
vide a means for identifying and legitimising them (Habermas 1990: 86).
The second sense in which Fives is mistaken is in opposing agonist to delibera-
tive practices. As we have seen, what lies behind such an opposition is Mouffe’s 
insistence on the impossibility in principle of universal rational consensus. How-
ever, we have shown, and Fives accepts, that this implies a performative contra-
diction. As such the claim cannot stand. Again it is rejected on rational, ethically 
neutral, grounds. Once this has been conceded, the way lies open to integrate the 
agonist and deliberative projects in a way that recognises their shared substan-
tive elements and goals (elements and goals which, incidentally, Fives himself 
acknowledges may be held in common (Fives 2009: 966)). To the extent that this 
is achieved, we can appreciate that agonist insights and practices contribute to, 
rather than oppose and undermine, deliberative goals. Of course, Fives consid-
ers that obstacles remain to such an integration—specifically the relativism and 
immoralism arising from agonism’s contextualism and its contestatory strategies 
(Fives 2009: 968–970). The integration I propose also allows us to appreciate how 
these difficulties may be resolved. So it is to a consideration of how we might com-
bine deliberation with an agonism divested of its central performative contradic-
tion—that is an agonism that admits, at least in principle, the possibility of a neu-
tral, universal, rational consensus—that I shall now turn. 
4. Integration—the model
My ultimate aim is to demonstrate the benefits to an agonism—minimally modi-
fied as proposed—and deliberation of an integration of the two approaches. But it 
is first necessary to outline what such an integration would look like. Otherwise it 
is difficult to comprehend how these benefits might be delivered. The integrated 
model I advance is grounded in the similarities between the theories of language 
that Mouffe deploys in support of her agonist proposals and those that underpin 
deliberative principles. Although both Gürsözlü and Fives acknowledge my 
 method here, neither engages with my analysis of these elements, despite rejecting 
my endeavour (Gürsözlü 2009: 361–2; Fives 2009: 973). It would therefore seem all 
the more important to re-state the key elements of that integration here. 
The conception of language on which Mouffe bases her agonism is primarily 
grounded in observations drawn from the later Wittgenstein (Mouffe 2000: 70–1), 
and the post-structuralist theories of Derrida (Mouffe 2000: 12, 21, 99–100) and 
Lacan (Mouffe 2000: 137–8). Although she uses these to construct a position that 
she opposes to deliberation, I argue that these perspectives are susceptible of an 
alternative interpretation, which permits the two accounts to be reconciled. I 
commence by drawing parallels between Wittgenstein’s observations and Haber-
mas’s discursive model of deliberation. I then extend these to the aspects of Der-
rida and Lacan’s thought that Mouffe deploys (Knops 2007: 118–125). 
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Wittgenstein’s1 later theory has language originating from shared ‘forms of life’—
our everyday practices and activities (Wittgenstein 1968: paras 19 & 23; Cavell 
1969: 52). I equate this with ‘normal communication’ which predominates in 
Habermas’s shared ‘lifeworld’ (Knops 2007: 122). Wittgenstein accepts that rea-
son allows those familiar with one form of life and its attendant language to un-
derstand those of another (Wittgenstein 1968: para. 87). In its simplest and most 
general form this process involves a person A acting on another person B to pro-
duce a response from B that A has predicted. A determines what act is most likely 
to bring about this response according to the understanding they have developed 
through their particular ‘form of life’. Where B’s reaction is as A forecast, this con-
firms A’s assumption that they understand B. Where it is not, this still provides A 
with information about how B differs in their view of the world or ‘form of life’. On 
the basis of this it is possible for A to reformulate their view of B. With this modi-
fication, derived from their shared interaction, A can try a new action which will 
either be successful or require further iterations of refinement. Through repeated 
interactions, understanding can be developed to the extent that B’s reactions are 
as A predicts. Although this process has been related in the most general terms 
of actions and responses, it covers the more specific form of language-learning, 
where the actions and responses are utterances (Knops 2007: 119). 
I argue that this form of exchange, which Wittgenstein terms ‘explanation’ (Witt-
genstein 1968: para. 87; Tully 1989: 180), mirrors Habermas’s account of delibera-
tion (Knops 2007: 121–2). In Habermas’s view, the process starts when person A 
makes a validity claim—to truth, moral rightness or authenticity. Such a claim 
can be seen as an utterance that expresses A’s understanding of the world, derived 
from A’s ‘form of life’. If this claim is rejected by B, then A must advance reasons 
for that claim that will convince B to accept it. In the paradigm case, rejection is 
signalled by B uttering a ‘no’ (Habermas 1990: 67). However, we can extend this 
to cover any utterance or reaction from B that A did not predict the claim would 
elicit. From this perspective this is simply another case of a response from B that 
A’s assumptions about B, based on A’s ‘form of life’, did not allow A to predict. And 
the reasons that A might advance constitute further claims or utterances express-
ing A’s understanding of B based on A’s ‘form of life’. Only now that knowledge in-
cludes A’s experience of acting on B and the unanticipated reaction which it pro-
voked. So reasons are simply further utterances which A thinks will produce the 
desired response—agreement to their original claim—from B. Of course, B might 
produce counter-arguments of their own, which could lead A to modify their 
claim. The process of interaction and the aim of mutual prediction—or agree-
ment—remains the same however (Knops 2007: 122). 
1  Mouffe’s characterisation of Wittgenstein’s later thought is based in particular on Pitkin 
(1993) and Tully (1989; 1995). To do justice to her, I focus on their interpretation. 
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Having established the identity of Wittgenstein’s process of ‘explanation’ with 
Habermas’s model of deliberation, I demonstrate that the same formula can 
 account for objections to the possibility of consensus that Mouffe raises by 
 reference to the post-structuralist theories of Derrida—difference, the constitu-
tive other and undecidability—and Lacan—the ‘master signifier’ (Knops 2007: 
123–5). As the principles are similar, I will not reproduce that reasoning here. 
 Taken together, the effect of my arguments is to clear the way for the integration 
of agonistic and deliberative insights. 
Instead of different discourses confronting each other we can now see that it is 
possible to develop a less partial model that incorporates both positions. In this 
model, agonism represents a theory of the moment of difference or contest with-
in a wider deliberative dialectic. The second moment, which deliberative theo-
ry focuses on, is that of bridging the recognised difference through recognising 
and developing underlying shared dimensions of experience, values and language 
which allow different ‘forms of life’ to mutually understand one another within 
a common frame that relates them. This common frame can then be used as the 
basis for co-ordinating action, in a way that respects these different, partial, con-
stituent forms of life. In this way, the dialectic is given a constructive dynamic that 
moves from more to less partial rational consensus. Far from doing violence to 
the initial component aspirations of agonism and deliberation, such a move leads 
to a clearer appreciation of their relative potential. I will now examine the bene-
fits such an integration has to offer both agonism and deliberation, in answering 
Gürsözlü and Fives’s remaining objections to this course. 
5. Integration—the benefits
In general terms, the advantages of an integrated model are that if we avoid the 
performative contradiction implicit in the agonist claim that a rational, universal 
consensus is in principle impossible, it provides a way of sustaining and animating 
the substance of agonist aspirations. By relegating the assertion that rational, 
universal consensus is impossible in principle to an assumption about any actual 
attempt at such consensus, we restore internal consistency to agonism. This move 
also opens the possibility of combining insights from agonism with those from 
deliberation as part of a shared dialectic that aims to move from more to less 
partial agreements. Reconceived as a theory of the moment of difference within 
this broader dialectic, agonist principles can be preserved and indeed sharpened. 
Notwithstanding both Gürsözlü and Fives’s arguments to the contrary, this 
benefits both agonism and deliberation. Below I present some of the main types 
of insight this enables in more specific detail, and the advantages they offer. 
First, the agonist clam that a consensus is hegemonic. As we have seen, coherence 
requires this is trimmed from an absolute claim about the possibility in principle 
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of consensus, to an assumption—that can be rationally disproved—about any 
actual consensus. However, this alteration presents a problem. A universal 
premiss that all consensus is hegemonic would have absolved us from the need 
to show that a particular example of consensus is hegemonic. Since this premiss 
is ruled out we must now distinguish whether a particular attempt at consensus 
is hegemonic or not. Recall the definition of hegemony by Laclau and Mouffe 
as a ‘particularity’ that ‘assumes the representation of a universality entirely 
incommensurable with it’ (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xii). Hegemony comprises a 
partial consensus which has been over-extended. So a method for identifying 
hegemonies must  offer a way of gauging the partiality of a consensus that is 
otherwise assumed to be inclusive. 
The process of explanation, or understanding, embodied in my integrated model, 
allows us to do just this. Encounters with other ‘forms of life’, resulting in failure to 
predict responses of those engaged in those forms, demonstrate the limits of our 
existing knowledge. In fact, Laclau and Mouffe acknowledge this role for differ-
ence. However, their treatment does not go beyond opposing current understand-
ing to new experience and their potential mutual subversion (Laclau & Mouffe 
1985: 110 n. 20 & 127–9). In terms of my model, they confine themselves to failure 
to predict. In order to describe how, or in what way, our existing knowledge is par-
tial, which we must if we are to gauge whether it is over-extended, we have to go 
further. It is necessary to relate that knowledge to its limiting other. Only by ask-
ing in what way they differ can we start to develop the framework within which to 
locate one ‘form of life’ in respect of the other. 
This involves the additional step of reflecting on the reaction that we failed to pre-
dict, and asking ourselves how it differed from that which we expected. In doing 
this, we locate the partiality of both our understanding, based on our ‘form of life,’ 
in respect of our interlocutor’s—we relate them. On the basis of this expanded 
understanding, we can also proceed to further interaction, in the hope that our 
subsequent actions meet with a predicted response. Insofar as this is achieved, we 
can be confident that our conception of the relation between our two forms of life 
is shared. To be assured of that relation, and our description of the relative par-
tiality of our respective positions, we therefore need to develop a shared under-
standing which provides a more comprehensive framework spanning both, with-
in which they can mutually oriented. So to describe their partiality in this way, 
we must already develop an expanded understanding that builds on them, and 
bridges the gap between them which it also defines. In locating partiality we build 
a framework that is less partial. 
It is this relational dimension which Laclau and Mouffe fail to recognise. Yet with-
out it, particular discourses remain simply different. There is no way to de scribe 
their appropriate scope. And so there is no way to evaluate whether a  particular 
IntegrAtIng AgOnISM wIth DelIBerAtIOn – reAlISIng the BeneFItS ANDREW KNOPS
164
 discourse has over-reached itself. In short, there is no way to tell whether a 
 particular discourse, or consensus, is hegemonic or not. It turns out then that 
the key agonist concept of hegemony requires a deliberative interpretation for its 
full realisation. Moreover, that process of realisation—the location of instances of 
hegemony through a description of the partiality of discourses—is quite simply 
identical with the central deliberative process of developing less partial under-
standings, or consensus, from encounters between more partial understandings. 
When interpreted within a dialectical framework, there is a coincidence between 
the process for identification of hegemony and rational consensus building. 
Not only is there a coincidence between these processes. We can also see how such 
an interpretation helps resolve deliberative suspicions about agonist relativism. 
Fives objects to the agonist assumption, underpinning the notion of hegemony, 
that all knowledge is contextual. He argues this consigns agonism to subjectivity 
and relativism, despite Mouffe’s disavowals (Fives 2009: 968–70). However, if we 
interpret agonism within the deliberative dialectic of developing less partial from 
more partial understanding, it is possible to retain the agonist insistence that all 
knowledge arises from ‘forms of life’, while at the same time recognising that it is 
possible to develop more or less inclusive, more or less explanatory, more or less 
partial knowledge from those contextual foundations. The result remains ground-
ed in experience, but is capable of covering more experience than the component 
understandings from which it has been derived. Hence Fives’s concerns about the 
relativist nature of agonism, versus the universalist pretensions of deliberation, are 
resolved. Subjectivity ceases to be grounds for opposing agonism to deliberation, 
and becomes instead an important shared component in their fusion, permitting 
a much more sophisticated understanding of the potential of political exchange. 
A similar approach can be adopted to the agonist notion of contestation. Again, 
Gürsözlü is worried this will be ‘subsumed’ under a deliberative emphasis on con-
sensus leading to premature closure on supposedly ‘neutral’ agreements that ac-
tually exclude and marginalise (Gürsözlü 2009: 365–6). In his turn Fives is worried 
an agonist emphasis on conflict and the passions is hostile to deliberative reason 
(Fives 2009: 976). We have seen Mouffe claims contestation characterises all poli-
tics. Although ‘domesticated’ within agonistic limits of respect, it should still be 
counted a healthy feature of democracy (above: 3–4). But taken as emphasising 
the element of divergence or difference in a deliberative dialectic, we can appre-
ciate how this agonist concern with conflict aims to distinguish differences. And 
this aim of distinguishing differences is central to the deliberative goal of promot-
ing maximally inclusive consensus. For deliberation does not aim for consensus 
tout court. Rather, it aims for a consensus that represents the settled, reasoned 
agreement of as many as possible, and that embodies their interests to the great-
est extent. For this reason deliberation shares with agonism the goal of giving 
maximum voice to different positions (e.g. Knops 2006). 
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Not only does deliberation share this aim. It also has a parallel mechanism for pro-
moting contestation that sits at the heart of the deliberative process: free ques-
tioning. The ability to question any assertion without hindrance is arguably delib-
eration’s most singular feature (Habermas 1990: 89). And questioning just is the 
contesting of differences, since it embodies the process of juxtaposing difference 
to an assumed consensus. A question challenges an assertion, since it is an unpre-
dicted response. That unpredicted response arises on the basis of a difference—
in lifeworld assumptions, or forms of life—and the understandings derived from 
them. Seen from this position, deliberation and the method of rational debate is 
at its core a method for maximally seeking out and giving voice to divergent po-
sitions and their contestation. By contrast, without deliberation, such differenc-
es can be passed over or never engage with each other. The deliberative impera-
tive to develop rational consensus ensures that these positions are fully exposed 
and contested. Because it mobilises the most stringent standard of inclusion—a 
universal rational consensus—it is fully sensitised to exclusion. Anything falling 
short of this ideal standard is seen as exclusion. Moreover, identification of ex-
clusion carries with it the imperative to remedy such marginalistion by engaging 
with it through challenging the status quo—contestation. Within a deliberative 
vision, therefore, this aspect of agonism receives its strongest expression. Without 
that framework, the danger is that such differences go unrecognised or if recog-
nised they are simply tolerated. So integrating agonism within deliberation both 
sharpens our sense of the importance of difference and contestation, albeit within 
agonistic bounds of respect, and through this improves the inclusiveness of any 
consensus that results. Again, both Gürsözlü and Fives can be assuaged. 
A third significant feature of agonism is contingency. Mouffe claims all political 
positions are fragile and open to challenge. Failure to recognise this risks oppress-
ing perspectives that a position excludes (above: 3). Contingency’s counterpart in 
deliberation is fallibility. Fallibility, in turn, is fundamental to a deliberative con-
cept of rationality. The definition of a rational assertion is precisely that it is con-
tingent and open to challenge (Habermas 1998: 140; 1987: 73). Once the equiva-
lence between agonist contingency and deliberative fallibility is appreciated, we 
can again see that deliberation acknowledges that all positions, or political agree-
ments, are open to challenge. Indeed, in founding deliberation on logical grounds 
of the avoidance of performative contradiction, even its most basic elements are 
opened to potential challenge. That this recognition is a foundational precept 
of rationality ensures that this tenet of agonism is safeguarded by a deliberative 
framework. It also highlights the importance for deliberation of paying heed to 
agonist injunctions to avoid premature closure. As agonists make clear, the pos-
sible consequences of such a mistake are that biased and exclusionary agreements 
appear to be settled in the interests of all. This hegemonic illusion of neutrality 
makes such domination more difficult to challenge. 
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The last point also helps us understand how even an agonist emphasis on the pas-
sions might be understood from a deliberative perspective. In aiming for a more 
inclusive consensus, deliberation recognises exclusion and marginalisation. Dis-
respect, oppression and domination may be deeply embedded and have existed 
for some time, with damaging consequences. Divisions may also have had the ef-
fect of distancing ‘forms of life’ so that it requires considerable effort for one to ex-
press itself in the terms of another. Indeed, due to the hostility thus engendered, 
and the association of the dominant form with oppression, there may be consid-
erable reluctance to do so. Moreover, adherents of the dominant form may see 
challenge as unsettling and threatening to their settled ‘worldview’, and so be re-
luctant or positively resistant to embrace its development to embrace alternatives, 
which they may perceive as threatening. All this can mean that challenge and 
 difference is first articulated in ways that draw more on extreme emotions—the 
passions, devoted to expressing identities or subject positions rather than relating 
them. While deliberative theory has never ruled these elements out, it should pay 
more attention to them as marking particular stages within the deliberative dia-
lectic. As elements in the expression of difference, understanding them can play 
an important role in developing more inclusive consensus. 
The final concern I wish to address is Fives’s worry about agonism’s ‘immoral-
ism’ (above: 4–5). Again, he sees this as a barrier to any integration with delibera-
tion. We have already seen how Fives considers that deliberation itself could be 
 susceptible to an inability to distinguish ‘good’ from ‘bad’ propositions. However, 
by recognising that deliberative practices and values are grounded in the rational 
premiss that any attempt at communication must avoid logical contradiction, we 
secure these foundations without surrendering ethical neutrality (above: 7). Once 
the process of rational debate has been secured, that process provides the basis 
for generating legitimate moral judgements. Since the integrated model proposed 
here integrates agonism into that process, as theorising the moment of difference 
within it, then it is secured from immoralism by the same route. Although ago-
nism concentrates on identifying, respecting and contesting difference, it does so 
as part of a dialectical deliberative process the outcomes of which embody legiti-
mate moral values and judgements. In this way an integrated agonism is shielded 
against the Fives’s charge of ‘immoralism’. Indeed, to the extent that legitimate 
moral judgements are the product of an inclusive consensus, they emphasise an 
indispensable element of the process of distinguishing good from bad. 
6. Conclusion
At the end of his criticism of my attempt to integrate agonism and deliberation 
Gürsözlü portrays it as an attempt at ‘hegemonic absorption’ by deliberation 
of agonism. Such an attempt, he argues, fails to respect important features of 
 agonism—notably the fundamentally hegemonic nature of the political and the 
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 contextualism, contingency and contestation that flows from that—which make 
it incompatible with deliberation. Recognition and respect for such differences 
would lead instead to a ‘vibrant, constructive agonism’ where both sides ‘recog-
nize each other as equals struggling against each other.’ (Gürsözlü 2009: 357). 
In this article I have attempted to clarify my position. To begin with, Gürsözlü 
is correct that my argument re-interprets agonism in an important way. I never 
 suggested otherwise. ‘Agonism as Deliberation’ is explicit that agonism must sur-
render its claim that universal rational consensus is impossible in principle if it is 
to remain consistent (Knops 2007: 118). Despite Gürsözlü’s attempts to argue the 
contrary, the sacrifice of this principle is necessary (above: 5–6). Failure to do so 
by a distinct agonism that hence remains opposed to deliberation would simply 
mean agonism remains incoherent, and so loses that confrontation. Fives has rec-
ognises that Mouffe’s denial of universal rational consensus in principle is funda-
mentally flawed (Fives 2009: 968). His response when faced with this inconsisten-
cy in an agonism he believes is antithetical to deliberation illustrates the problem 
with Gürsözlü’s pursuit of separatism. By continuing to oppose agonism to de-
liberation, the insights of the former—such as the subjective basis of knowledge, 
the importance of identifying and contesting difference, and the contingency and 
fallibility of any actual agreement—run the risk of rejection or marginalisation 
within the vision of the latter. This is clearly illustrated by Fives aggressively per-
fectionist model of the universal virtues of deliberation. With its hostility to sub-
jectivity and contestation it distorts the roles these can play in deliberatively de-
veloping less partial knowledge that respects and builds upon constituent ‘forms 
of life’, all of which are derived from contextualised individual experience (Fives 
2009: 968–70; 974–79). While Gürsözlü’s approach respects difference to the let-
ter this shows that it does not provide a particularly ‘constructive’ or, indeed, ‘ago-
nistically vibrant’ outcome. 
I have presented a case for a more positive alternative, building on the space that 
rejection of agonism’s denial of universal rational consensus in principle opens for 
a reconciliation with deliberation. Having demonstrated how such an approach 
can be independently justified without recourse to Five’s perfectionist virtue 
 ethics, I then explain how it can sustain and indeed sharpen and revitalise cen-
tral agonist concepts such as hegemony and its associated notions of contextual-
ism, contingency and contestation. Rather than opposing agonism to deliberative 
goals, however, we can appreciate that such goals are shared. These insights can 
be deployed in their support. I even argue this treatment can be extended to rec-
ognise a deliberative role for the passions. 
The key to my argument is the interpretive step of reconstructing an agonism di-
vested of the inconsistent denial of universal rational consensus in principle as a 
theory that emphasises the moment of difference within a broader deliberative 
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dialectic. Combined with a parallel stress on consensus building that maximally 
incorporates such difference, this dialectic aims to move from more to less partial, 
and less exclusive, understanding. Far from denying or ignoring agonist insights 
and aspirations, I try to show that the more stringent standards and supplemen-
tary resources of deliberation animate those aspirations and throw those concepts 
into clearer relief. 
My model, and its associated values and practices thus set out a subject posi-
tion, defined by this dialectical deliberative process, along with the advantages 
that  attach to it. This has been presented to you, the reader, in an attempt to per-
suade you to accept and adhere to this identity—to motivate you to give it your al-
legiance. Or, if you prefer, I have argued rationally in favour of that model, which 
you are free to decide to accept or reject on the basis of your assessment of the 
force of the better argument. And these parallel descriptions of what this article 
has been about illustrate just one more way in which agonist and deliberative pro-
cesses may be constructively and dynamically integrated, rather than separated 
and statically opposed. 
Primljeno: 14. decembar 2012.
Prihvaćeno: 30. decembar 2012.
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endrju Knops
Prednosti integrisanja agonizma i deliberacije
Apstrakt
U članku „Agonizam kao deliberacija“ (Knops 2007) predložio sam pomirenje između 
agonističke verzije demokratije Mufove, uz određene korekcije kako bi se očuvala kon-
zistentnost, i deliberacije. Ovde nudim odgovor na dve kritike ovog projekta koje su 
usledile: gürsözlü (2009) i Fives (2009). Iako oba autora smatraju da nije moguće pomi-
riti agonizam i deliberaciju, oni to čine sa suprotnih pozicija. gursozlu brani agonizam 
Mufove kao poseban i koherentan projekat na osnovu onoga što smatra ispravnim ra-
zumevanjem njenog pojma hegemonije. Fajvs tvrdi da je njen pristup poseban ali neko-
herentan, i da zato treba da bude odbačen. nasuprot ove dve suprotstavljene pozicije, 
nastojaću da pokažem ne samo da je moguća integracija agonizma i deliberacije, već i 
da je veoma korisna kako za agonizam, tako i za deliberativnu teoriju. Oslobođen kon-
tradiktorne tvrdnje da je univerzalni racionalni konsenzus u principu nemoguće postići, 
agonizam se može interpretirati kao teorija momenta razlike unutar šire deliberativne 
dijalektike koja pokušava da od parcijalnog, dođe do šireg konsenzusa. Ako ih posma-
tramo na taj način, možemo da uvidimo kako se ova dva pristupa dopunjuju u traganju 
za zajedničkim ciljevima, pre nego što predstavljaju statičnu i nužnu opoziciju kako to 
smatraju kritičari kojima se u ovom članku bavim.
Ključne reči demokratija, agonizam, deliberacija, Muf, habermas.
